Remote detection of data centres

R1Proposed

Remote detection of data centres is a set of methods for finding facilities and estimating their size from outside.

Large AI data centres need buildings, substations and cooling equipment, and they shed roughly as much heat as the electricity they use. These features can be seen without the operator's cooperation. Analysts already combine satellite imagery with permits and utility filings to track the construction of known large facilities and estimate their power capacity.

For verification, the harder task is finding facilities nobody has declared. As of September 2026 no systematic search for such facilities has been published, and automated detection of data centres remains mainly conceptual. Imagery also cannot see inside buildings or count chips.

The main weaknesses are concealment, such as disguising a facility as other industry or building it underground, and sites too small to stand out. Verification frameworks treat these signals as supplements to stronger mechanisms.

Readinessmedium confidence

R1 for finding undeclared facilities, because no public work shows a systematic search that finds them.

Rubric assessment

Assessed use: finding undeclared data centres (capacity estimates for known sites would meet at least R2)

  • R1 met: Halstead and Larsen describe heat, imagery and other detection signals, ways to conceal a facility and the odds of detecting covert ones 4. Baker et al. place satellite imagery among supplementary verification mechanisms 5.
  • R2 not met for this use: Krawec's case studies track known sites 1. Epoch AI reports that its public database finds large facilities mainly through company announcements, news, third-party databases and social media 3. Krawec states that automated data-centre detection "remains primarily conceptual at present" 1.

The level is for the primary use (There is no undeclared relevant compute). For the supporting use of estimating the capacity of known sites (Compute stock is at most a declared amount), the public Epoch database, with its published error estimates, would meet at least R2 2 3.

Gaps to the next level
  • Published end-to-end results on finding previously unknown large facilities over a wide area, with measured miss and false-alarm rates.
  • An evaluation against a stated concealment adversary, for example disguised or underground facilities.

Assessed 2026-09-25 against rubric v1.1.

On this page

How it works

Remote detection infers the existence, size and status of data centres without entering them 1. Electro-optical satellite imagery shows these features 1:

  • large data halls;
  • substations and switchyards;
  • on-site gas turbines and backup generators;
  • cooling towers and chillers;
  • construction progress.

Analysts combine imagery with permits, utility filings, company announcements and other open sources 1. Free imagery comes from archives such as the ESA Copernicus Sentinel and NASA Landsat missions 1. Paid commercial imagery reaches sub-metre resolution, from providers such as Planet Labs, Airbus and Vantor 1.

Capacity can be estimated from cooling equipment 1 2. Epoch AI's Frontier Data Centers Hub finds chillers and cooling towers in satellite images and checks them against permits and public disclosures 2. From these it infers each facility's power capacity, and then the compute installed, in H100-equivalents 2.

Halstead and Larsen treat waste heat as the main obstacle to hiding a facility 4. They note that "each megawatt of electricity going into a datacenter must be matched with a megawatt going out in some form (mostly as heat)" 4. They list other signals 4:

  • Infrared satellites can see exhaust air and cooling plumes.
  • Radar interferometry can reveal ground movement from excavation.
  • Ground moving-target radar can track logistics vehicles.

Ansari also notes that infrared remote sensing can detect undeclared data centres through their heat signatures 6.

Verification frameworks usually give these signals a supporting role 5. Baker et al. list satellite or aerial images, open-source intelligence, information from data-centre suppliers and financial audits as "less robust mechanisms" that could supplement the main ones 5. One of their main layers is national intelligence activities, which can draw on human, cyber and signals intelligence 5. Remote detection complements chip accounting (Chip registries and manufacturing records) and workload classification (Workload classification from telemetry and side channels).

What it establishes

From outside, analysts can see construction progress, site layout and power and cooling infrastructure, and can estimate power capacity approximately 1 2. In one of Krawec's case studies, Epoch AI's capacity estimates from cooling equipment ranged from about 200 to 500 MW, against a published expected capacity of 300 MW 1. Imagery can also reveal gaps between announced and observed construction 1.

Remote detection has five gaps:

  • Electro-optical imagery "can only view the outside of buildings", so it gives no chip counts, chip types or actual power consumption 1.
  • Capacity figures from cooling equipment are approximations, not measurements of energy use 1.
  • Power figures alone cannot distinguish AI training from other high-performance computing 6.
  • Heim and Pilz wrote in 2024 that AI data centres had no visual features that set them apart from data centres hosting other compute, and that large companies often place AI compute on existing campuses 7.
  • Observing data centres does not help find chips that have been produced but not yet installed 4.

Threat model

Remote detection assumes that large facilities have physical signatures that are hard to remove, such as buildings, substations, cooling equipment and waste heat 1 4. It uses imagery and public records, so it needs no cooperation from the operator 1.

The adversary may try to hide a facility 4. Halstead and Larsen consider disguising sites as industrial facilities, and underground designs whose cooling avoids visible plumes 4.

The approach also assumes access to recent imagery and skilled analysts. Krawec lists cloud cover, smoke and weather, the cost of recent high-resolution imagery and the need for trained analysts as constraints 1.

Evidence

  • Krawec's May 2026 report for the Federation of American Scientists presents two case studies 1. One tracks a facility's construction over 2024 and 2025 against public announcements 1. The other counts infrastructure at an operating AI facility and checks it against utility records and permits 1.
  • Epoch AI's hub covered 13 large US data centres at its launch in November 2025 2. Epoch estimated that they held about 2.5 million of the roughly 15 million H100-equivalents delivered to customers worldwide in recent years 2. The data are released under a Creative Commons Attribution licence 2.
  • By September 2026 the database still mostly covered US sites, and Epoch estimated its coverage of global deployed AI computing capacity at 44% (90% CI 24–81%) 3. Epoch reports that 80% of its IT-power estimates are within a factor of 1.4 of the actual value, and that its estimates were near-perfect in the two cases where it obtained ground-truth cooling capacity 3.
  • Halstead and Larsen are "relatively confident" that before a deal, intelligence services could locate every AI data centre in the country their scenario examines, other than specifically concealed ones, using methods like those of Epoch AI and commercial analysts 4. They estimate the chance that unilateral detection methods find a covert project within ten years of an international agreement 4. For a single site they give 26% at 10 MW, 35% at 100 MW and 50% at 1 GW 4. For ten sites of each size they give 37%, 67% and 85% 4. They call these estimates highly speculative, based entirely on intuition and qualitative reasoning 4.
  • Krawec recommends satellite imagery as one element of verification for future agreements, and points to the IAEA's satellite imagery analysis team for nuclear safeguards 1. The report names thermal infrared, synthetic-aperture radar and multispectral imaging as directions for further research 1.

Limitations

  • Facilities can be disguised as other industry or placed underground 4.
  • A sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence 4. Small data centres in existing buildings may lack distinctive signatures 1.
  • Without a known location, telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities is hard, and automated detection is mainly conceptual 1.
  • Chip counts, chip types and actual energy use cannot be observed 1.
  • Cooling and power features vary across companies and countries, and not every site generates its own power 1.

Known flaws

Published flaws, with their severity, kind and status. How flaws are rated.

  • Facilities can be disguised or hiddenSignificantTheoretical argumentOpen

    Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering 4.

  • Small sites may not be detectableSignificantTheoretical argumentOpen

    Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites 4. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities 1.

  • Search for unknown sites is undemonstratedSignificantOpen questionOpen

    Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection "remains primarily conceptual at present" 1.

Blockers

Sources

  1. BC. Krawec (2026). Tracking Hyperscale AI Data Center Growth with Satellite Imagery. Federation of American Scientists. Source recordSupports: observable features; imagery sources and limits; capacity estimate example; cannot see inside; automated detection conceptual and its data needs; IAEA analogy; future sensors · Methodology; Opportunities and Challenges; Case Studies 1-2; Recommendations; Opportunities for Further Research
  2. CEpoch AI (2025). Introducing the Frontier Data Centers Hub. Epoch AI. Source recordSupports: public dataset; cooling-equipment-based capacity method; coverage figures; licence · announcement post
  3. BEpoch AI (2026). AI Data Centers Documentation – Methodology. Epoch AI. Source recordSupports: how sites are found; reported accuracy of IT-power estimates; estimated coverage of global AI computing capacity (provider-reported) · Coverage; Cooling model; Analysis
  4. CB. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). Covert AI Projects. AI 2040. Source recordSupports: heat-balance argument; detection signals; confidence in locating non-concealed data centres; concealment strategies; intuition-based detection probabilities and their conditions; limits for small projects; undeployed chips · detection sections; direct observation of AI datacenters; table of intuition-based detection probabilities by site size and number of sites
  5. BM. Baker et al. (2025). Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment. RAND Corporation. Source recordSupports: satellite imagery, OSINT, supplier information and financial audits as supplementary mechanisms; national intelligence layer · §4.3, §4.4
  6. BS. Ansari (2026). Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification. arXiv. Source recordSupports: infrared imaging can detect undeclared data centres; power alone cannot separate AI from other HPC · §3.1 (M4)
  7. CL. Heim & K. Pilz (2024). Limitations of Satellite Imagery Analysis for AI-Specific Data Centers. Lennart Heim's blog. Source recordSupports: AI data centres not visually distinguishable from other data centres (2024); AI compute housed in existing campuses · blog post

M-0020JSONSource-checked 2026-09-25 · changed 2026-09-28Suggest an edit

Also called Satellite monitoring of data centres; Remote sensing of AI compute facilities; National technical means for AI compute

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